<p>We discuss a blockchain-driven green supply chain involving a bank, a supplier, and a financially constrained retailer. To cover the costs of purchasing and green investment, the retailer has two financing options: (i) bank credit, and (ii) mixed financing of bank credit and trade credit. Building on the traditional Stackelberg game in which the supplier possesses full bargaining power in determining the wholesale price, we develop a Nash bargaining game model wherein the supplier negotiates the wholesale price with the retailer, aiming to investigate the players’ financing preferences and blockchain adoption strategies. We observe that the supplier consistently prefers to offer trade credit. Interestingly, blockchain technology can alter the retailer’s financing preference. Specifically, in the absence of blockchain, the retailer consistently prefers bank credit. Nevertheless, the retailer prefers bank credit in a blockchain-driven supply chain when incurring a high unit blockchain operational cost. With regard to the blockchain adoption strategies, both the retailer and the supplier are more likely to adopt blockchain when the unit blockchain operational cost is low. In contrast, the bank’s motivation to adopt blockchain hinges on the unit blockchain operational cost and the bank’s interest rate. Compared to Stackelberg game, the bargaining process can also alter the financing preferences of the retailer and the bank. Finally, blockchain technology exerts a significant influence on consumer welfare. With a low unit blockchain operational cost, blockchain technology can enhance consumer welfare under both bank credit and mixed financing.</p>