<p>This paper forms an O2O retail supply chain where a retailer sells products in the brick-and-mortar store and through the online platform that may issue coupons. Using game theory models, this paper investigates the retailer’s pricing strategy without and with coupons and the platform’s coupon strategy under different power structures. The results show that the members with greater power can gain more profit, while the system with balanced power can enhance overall profit in the presence of platform coupons. In the retailer Stackelberg power structure, issuing platform coupons worsens (benefits) two members and the system under a low (high) commission fee. In the vertical Nash power structure, issuing platform coupons always benefits the retailer and the system, yet it worsens (benefits) the platform under a low (high) commission fee. In the platform Stackelberg power structure, issuing platform coupons always benefits two members and the system. The results explain the interplay between power structure and platform coupons within O2O retail supply chains, providing guidance for retail practitioners.</p>