<p>We examine a dual-channel live-streaming supply chain consisting of a brand owner, an offline retailer, and a key opinion leader (KOL) anchor to investigate the impact of pricing power and network externality on supply chain decisions and member profits, and also explore the brand owner’s preference between KOL live-streaming and self-live-streaming. We find that the enhanced network externality can bring both a positive <i>demand growth effect</i> and a negative <i>channel conflict effect</i> for the brand owner. Interestingly, if the KOL anchor holds the pricing power (scenario KP), the brand owner’s profit may decrease as the network externality increases when the channel conflict effect dominates. However, a monotonic result arises if the brand owner holds the pricing power (scenario BP), where the demand growth effect always dominates. The enhancement of network externality is also not always beneficial for the KOL anchor. Furthermore, holding pricing power is consistently beneficial for the brand owner, but this advantage may not always extend to the KOL anchor. Finally, the brand owner may opt for self-live-streaming in scenario KP regardless of whether the network externality is high or low, whereas, in scenario BP, the brand owner will choose self-live-streaming only when the network externality is low.</p>

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Impact of pricing power and network externality in a dual-channel live-streaming supply chain

  • Ruisi Yang,
  • Chuxiang Xu,
  • Shan Lyu

摘要

We examine a dual-channel live-streaming supply chain consisting of a brand owner, an offline retailer, and a key opinion leader (KOL) anchor to investigate the impact of pricing power and network externality on supply chain decisions and member profits, and also explore the brand owner’s preference between KOL live-streaming and self-live-streaming. We find that the enhanced network externality can bring both a positive demand growth effect and a negative channel conflict effect for the brand owner. Interestingly, if the KOL anchor holds the pricing power (scenario KP), the brand owner’s profit may decrease as the network externality increases when the channel conflict effect dominates. However, a monotonic result arises if the brand owner holds the pricing power (scenario BP), where the demand growth effect always dominates. The enhancement of network externality is also not always beneficial for the KOL anchor. Furthermore, holding pricing power is consistently beneficial for the brand owner, but this advantage may not always extend to the KOL anchor. Finally, the brand owner may opt for self-live-streaming in scenario KP regardless of whether the network externality is high or low, whereas, in scenario BP, the brand owner will choose self-live-streaming only when the network externality is low.