Exploring separating equilibrium in the agricultural e-commerce market: Can repurchase be a quality signal?

The asymmetry of quality information in e-commerce of agricultural products has hindered its development, and it is urgent to find new quality signals. Compared with subjective online reviews, “repurchase” is more objective. This paper explores the effectiveness of “repurchase” as a quality signal, capable of genuinely conveying quality information in agricultural product e-commerce. By constructing a two-stage signal game model, the effects of repurchase on subsequent consumer purchasing behavior and market equilibrium of agricultural products are analyzed. Through the research, we not only get the optimal pricing of high and low quality agricultural products under the two market equilibrium states of “pooling–pooling” and “pooling–separating”, but also get the conditions of realizing “pooling–separating” equilibrium through the comparison of profits. The conclusion of this study provides a theoretical basis for e-commerce agricultural products sellers to send reliable signals through scientific pricing decisions and e-commerce platforms to mark consumers’ repurchase behavior.