Cooperative investment of service efforts and bundled pricing of complementary products in a tourism omnichannel

In a dynamically changing environment of post-pandemic, uncooperative investment of multiple tourism product suppliers’ service efforts and non-synergistic bundled pricing of multiple complementary tourism products lead to poor consumer experiences and satisfactions and low operational performance of tourism omnichannel. This study takes a game-theoretical approach to explore and understand the business dynamics regarding the investment of service efforts and bundled pricing mechanism of multiple suppliers’ complementary products in a tourism omnichannel, evolving rapidly in the tourism industry with still rare research literature. A generic tourism omnichannel structure with multiple complementary tourism product suppliers is conceptualized and formulated into game-theoretical models to investigate the optimal operational decisions on the service efforts investment and bundled pricing approach considering centralized, decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios. The derivation and comparison of the optimal decisions and outcomes for these models have shown that the cooperative strategy regarding the investment of service efforts and the bundled pricing of complementary products creates better operational performance than those of the decentralized ones in a tourism omnichannel. The findings of the numerical and sensitivity analyses offer valuable strategic insights to tourism omnichannel practitioners. The tourism omnichannel study also provides a better theoretical foundation for future tourism omnichannel research.