<p>This paper provides a game-theoretic foundation for James Buchanan’s concept of “relatively absolute absolutes”. This paradoxical notion captures Buchanan’s effort to reconcile two seemingly incompatible imperatives: constitutional rules must function as binding constraints in ordinary politics while remaining subject to peaceful revision through unanimous consent. We model this tension through a game where citizens choose between a neutral lottery mechanism and costly conflict to resolve disputes. The analysis reveals conditions under which self-interested agents will voluntarily adopt and respect procedural rules without invoking moral authority. Once established, the lottery deters unilateral defection because any violation triggers the costly conflict all parties seek to avoid, while unanimity remains an admissible path to peaceful revision when every citizen strictly gains from reopening the constitutional vote. The model thus shows how legitimate political order can be adopted and sustained from strategic considerations alone: rules are “absolute” in ordinary politics because breach is privately costly, but “relative” in principle because unanimous revision remains possible. This provides microfoundations for Buchanan’s constitutional contractarianism without invoking moral truth.</p>