<p>Famously pioneered by Ronald Coase, the theory of the firm and its subsequent development has been premised on a set of complete property rights that can be perfectly enforced. When firms are used instead of markets, then, the firm’s boundary has been presumed to be demarcated by proprietary completeness. However, the emergence of the digital platform era fused with behavioral economic methods and insights gives rise to questions about the firm’s boundary and its capacity for absorbing, thinning, or thickening in response to the availability of information about social issues. Shareholders and managers are increasingly feeling compelled to suspend or refrain from exercising in their entirety their control rights over a firm’s assets lest they risk reputational penalties in the form of social censure. The firm’s boundary, therefore, may not be a complete set of property rights, as traditionally assumed, but rather a socio-legal concept that is porous and malleable. This article develops this proposition but also questions the desirability of private actors (like digital platforms) regulating the proprietary rights of others.</p>