<p>This study tests the implications of the Political Legislation Cycles (PLC) theory in the legislative production of Italian Regions from 2000 to 2024. PLCs represent a dynamic distortion in policy decisions driven by electoral incentives, which prompts legislators to concentrate the approval of laws near the end of the legislature; as such, PLC can be interpreted as a quantitative measure of lack of political accountability. Focusing on Italian Regions, whose set of legislative competencies is more clearly defined than those of national governments, this research analyzes how decentralization, fiscal autonomy and political factors affect legislative behavior. Our findings reveal legislative cycles primarily in Regions with an Ordinary Statute, characterized by fewer competencies and higher transfer dependency than Special Statute Regions. Furthermore, the magnitude of the cycles is greater in Central and Southern regions compared to Northern ones. Controlling for the personal characteristics of “governors”, we find evidence that Regions governed by left wing coalitions are associated with cycles of greater magnitude; stability of regional coalitions and their ideological alignment with the central government also appears to positively impact the size of the legislative cycles. A battery of robustness tests confirms the reliability of the results.</p>