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<p>This paper empirically investigates the effect of political competition on the choice of discretionary award procedures in public procurement. It leverages data from Italian municipalities in the period 2009–2015, exploiting both widely used political indicators and the entry of an anti-establishment political party through matching estimators. The findings link political competition with a reduced likelihood of about 2–4% that contracting authorities choose discretionary procedures over formal auctions. The results align with two potential explanations: (i) diminished reliance on relational contracting or favoritism/corruption and (ii) bureaucratic defensive strategies. These findings are respectively consistent with either (a) the disturbance of an equilibrium based on <i>sharing compromising information</i> by Gambetta (<CitationRef CitationID="CR49">2018</CitationRef>); and/or (b) <i>third-party opportunism</i> (Spiller, <CitationRef CitationID="CR71">2009</CitationRef>). The evidence cautiously points to the second interpretation as the more plausible explanation of the results.</p>

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Political competition and discretionary procedures in public procurement: evidence from Italian data

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月6日

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  • Alessandro Cavalieri

摘要

This paper empirically investigates the effect of political competition on the choice of discretionary award procedures in public procurement. It leverages data from Italian municipalities in the period 2009–2015, exploiting both widely used political indicators and the entry of an anti-establishment political party through matching estimators. The findings link political competition with a reduced likelihood of about 2–4% that contracting authorities choose discretionary procedures over formal auctions. The results align with two potential explanations: (i) diminished reliance on relational contracting or favoritism/corruption and (ii) bureaucratic defensive strategies. These findings are respectively consistent with either (a) the disturbance of an equilibrium based on sharing compromising information by Gambetta (2018); and/or (b) third-party opportunism (Spiller, 2009). The evidence cautiously points to the second interpretation as the more plausible explanation of the results.