<p>The learning with errors (<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{LWE}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) problem has been widely utilized as a foundation for numerous cryptographic tools over the years. In this study, we focus on an algebraic variant of the <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{LWE}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> problem called <i>Group ring</i> <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{LWE}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> (<InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">GR</mi> <mtext>-</mtext> <mspace width="0.333333em" /> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>). We select group rings (or their direct summands) that underlie specific families of finite groups constructed by taking the semi-direct product of two cyclic groups. Unlike the Ring-<InlineEquation ID="IEq5"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{LWE}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> problem described in [<CitationRef CitationID="CR35">35</CitationRef>], the multiplication operation in the group rings considered here is non-commutative. As an extension of Ring-<InlineEquation ID="IEq6"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{LWE} \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, it maintains computational hardness and can be potentially applied in many cryptographic scenarios. In this paper, we present two polynomial-time quantum reductions. Firstly, we provide a quantum reduction from the worst-case shortest independent vectors problem (<InlineEquation ID="IEq7"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{SIVP}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">SIVP</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>) on ideal lattices with polynomial approximation factor to the search version of <InlineEquation ID="IEq8"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">GR</mi> <mtext>-</mtext> <mspace width="0.333333em" /> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation>. This reduction requires that the underlying group ring possesses certain mild properties; Secondly, we present another quantum reduction for two types of group rings, where the worst-case <InlineEquation ID="IEq9"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{SIVP}\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">SIVP</mi> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> problem is directly reduced to the (average-case) decision <InlineEquation ID="IEq10"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">GR</mi> <mtext>-</mtext> <mspace width="0.333333em" /> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> problem. The pseudorandomness of <InlineEquation ID="IEq11"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">GR</mi> <mtext>-</mtext> <mspace width="0.333333em" /> <mi mathvariant="sans-serif">LWE</mi> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> samples guaranteed by this reduction can be consequently leveraged to construct semantically secure public-key cryptosystems.</p>

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Learning with errors over group rings constructed by semi-direct product

  • Jiaqi Liu,
  • Fang-Wei Fu

摘要

The learning with errors ( \(\textsf{LWE}\) LWE ) problem has been widely utilized as a foundation for numerous cryptographic tools over the years. In this study, we focus on an algebraic variant of the \(\textsf{LWE}\) LWE problem called Group ring \(\textsf{LWE}\) LWE ( \(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \) GR - LWE ). We select group rings (or their direct summands) that underlie specific families of finite groups constructed by taking the semi-direct product of two cyclic groups. Unlike the Ring- \(\textsf{LWE}\) LWE problem described in [35], the multiplication operation in the group rings considered here is non-commutative. As an extension of Ring- \(\textsf{LWE} \) LWE , it maintains computational hardness and can be potentially applied in many cryptographic scenarios. In this paper, we present two polynomial-time quantum reductions. Firstly, we provide a quantum reduction from the worst-case shortest independent vectors problem ( \(\textsf{SIVP}\) SIVP ) on ideal lattices with polynomial approximation factor to the search version of \(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \) GR - LWE . This reduction requires that the underlying group ring possesses certain mild properties; Secondly, we present another quantum reduction for two types of group rings, where the worst-case \(\textsf{SIVP}\) SIVP problem is directly reduced to the (average-case) decision \(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \) GR - LWE problem. The pseudorandomness of \(\textsf{GR} \text{- }\textsf{LWE} \) GR - LWE samples guaranteed by this reduction can be consequently leveraged to construct semantically secure public-key cryptosystems.