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<p>Against the backdrop of deepening reform in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), investigating how ownership structure shapes executive incentive mechanisms carries significant theoretical and practical implications for advancing the modernization of SOEs governance and high-quality development. This paper innovatively incorporates ESG performance into the analysis of executive incentives by developing a tripartite evolutionary game model. Numerical simulations are employed to examine the significant mediating role of ESG performance in the design of executive incentive schemes by state-owned shareholders, as well as the impact of ESG excess returns on corporate governance decisions. The results indicate that: (1) an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) exists within the tripartite game among government regulators, state-owned shareholders, and the senior executives of SOEs; (2) corporate ESG performance and the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholders are key determinants in the choice of SOEs ownership structure; (3) for SOEs with limited public-interest functions, retaining state-owned shareholders as the controlling majority remains essential; and (4) mechanism analysis further reveals that ESG performance permeates the entire process of ownership structure choice and executive incentives design. It acts as a catalyst, encouraging state-owned shareholders to pursue ownership structure optimization, thereby forming a positive feedback loop.</p>

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Ownership Structure and Executive Incentives in Chinese SOEs: An ESG-Integrated Tripartite Evolutionary Game Approach

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月4日

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  • Zhong Tian,
  • Ying Wang,
  • Xiangyu Mao,
  • Haohao Song

摘要

Against the backdrop of deepening reform in Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), investigating how ownership structure shapes executive incentive mechanisms carries significant theoretical and practical implications for advancing the modernization of SOEs governance and high-quality development. This paper innovatively incorporates ESG performance into the analysis of executive incentives by developing a tripartite evolutionary game model. Numerical simulations are employed to examine the significant mediating role of ESG performance in the design of executive incentive schemes by state-owned shareholders, as well as the impact of ESG excess returns on corporate governance decisions. The results indicate that: (1) an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) exists within the tripartite game among government regulators, state-owned shareholders, and the senior executives of SOEs; (2) corporate ESG performance and the shareholding ratio of state-owned shareholders are key determinants in the choice of SOEs ownership structure; (3) for SOEs with limited public-interest functions, retaining state-owned shareholders as the controlling majority remains essential; and (4) mechanism analysis further reveals that ESG performance permeates the entire process of ownership structure choice and executive incentives design. It acts as a catalyst, encouraging state-owned shareholders to pursue ownership structure optimization, thereby forming a positive feedback loop.