<p>To mitigate environmental issues and climate change, the large-scale development of CCUS has become a global consensus. Although market players are key driving forces to promote the application of CCUS technology, the significant diversity and complexity of their decision-making behaviors also pose certain challenges for its industrialization. Therefore, this study constructs a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model of market investors, CCUS operators and power generation enterprises (PGEs), to analyze the internal mechanism of their behavioral evolution in complex environments. This model considers the differences in transaction mode and cooperation mode, and incorporates key factors such as the first-order carbon trading price, carbon market trading price, and the proportion of CO₂ recycling. The numerical simulation results indicate that: (1) The key to promoting the industrialized development of CCUS lies in guaranteeing the profitability of CCUS projects, with the carbon market trading price and the proportion of CO₂ recycling are the crucial factors. (2) As a means of coordinating the benefits among market players, the reasonable setting of the first-order carbon trading price and the proportion of cooperation benefit distribution is crucial for effectively stimulating the enthusiasm of market players. (3) The current development of renewable energy and the industrial deployment of CCUS are complementary in terms of carbon reduction, and PGEs should flexibly choose the most favorable way to reduce emissions. (4) Compared with the transaction mode, the cooperation mode is more suited to the current state of CCUS industrialization, which relies on a reasonable benefit distribution mechanism.</p>