<p>Enterprises are faced with the dilemma of choosing comprehensive we-media advertising or specialized we-media advertising when making investment decisions in we-media advertising. Considering the difference between the click-through rate and marginal profit of two kinds of we-media advertising and the impact of the click-through rate of advertising on product sales, we construct the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium investment model, cooperative Nash equilibrium investment model and Stackelberg game investment models. We find that there is a free-rider effect in enterprises' we-media advertising investment. There are conditions for a high return on investment in we-media advertising investment. Compared with the non-cooperative Nash investment situation, the we-media advertisement with priority investment in Stackelberg equilibrium investment situations has the highest investment income and investment return rate, while the we-media advertising with secondary investment is on the contrary. The total return of we-media advertising investment in the cooperative Nash equilibrium strategy is the largest; the relationship between the total investment and total return under the four strategies is related to the marginal profit and click-through rate of the two kinds of we-media advertising. Our conclusions can provide a theoretical basis and suggestions for enterprises to make investment decisions in we-media advertising.</p>

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We-media Advertising Investment Strategy of Enterprises in the Mobile Internet Environment

  • Zhongya Han,
  • Lili Shi,
  • Zhengqiu Weng,
  • Muyao Chen,
  • Qinglin Li

摘要

Enterprises are faced with the dilemma of choosing comprehensive we-media advertising or specialized we-media advertising when making investment decisions in we-media advertising. Considering the difference between the click-through rate and marginal profit of two kinds of we-media advertising and the impact of the click-through rate of advertising on product sales, we construct the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium investment model, cooperative Nash equilibrium investment model and Stackelberg game investment models. We find that there is a free-rider effect in enterprises' we-media advertising investment. There are conditions for a high return on investment in we-media advertising investment. Compared with the non-cooperative Nash investment situation, the we-media advertisement with priority investment in Stackelberg equilibrium investment situations has the highest investment income and investment return rate, while the we-media advertising with secondary investment is on the contrary. The total return of we-media advertising investment in the cooperative Nash equilibrium strategy is the largest; the relationship between the total investment and total return under the four strategies is related to the marginal profit and click-through rate of the two kinds of we-media advertising. Our conclusions can provide a theoretical basis and suggestions for enterprises to make investment decisions in we-media advertising.