<p>Technological innovation activities by enterprises benefit their development and contribute significantly to the socioeconomic advancement of society as a whole. The study has developed a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, banks, and enterprises, exploring the strategic evolution and mutual influence among these diverse stakeholders throughout the innovation process. Firstly, the study constructs the model based on assumed conditions and conducts stability analysis using model parameters. Furthermore, it calculates the Jacobian determinant and derives four sets of stable strategies during the dynamic game process based on the asymptotic stability conditions. Lastly, parameter simulations are performed to discuss the decision directions of enterprises, banks, and governments under different conditions. The results indicate that when the benefits of using new technologies for enterprises are lower than traditional returns, they will reject innovation adoption. Similarly, banks will only provide innovative financing services if subsidies from government departments support the confirmation costs associated with offering such services. Additionally, excessive government subsidies are detrimental to innovation activities’ sustainability, as high fiscal burdens undermine government support incentives. During the innovation process, subsidies and support from banks and government departments significantly impact enterprises. Therefore, the study constructs an evolutionary game model that includes enterprises, banks, and government entities, discussing the mutual influence of these stakeholders throughout the innovation process.</p>