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<p>This article investigates the role of industry codes of conduct (CoC) in regulating abusive informal debt collection within the EU. Focusing on national associations affiliated with the Federation of European National Collection Associations (FENCA), it evaluates the extent to which these codes function as effective self-regulation tools. Through a three-stage analysis—content review, benchmarking of code quality, and examination of enforcement practices—the study assesses their alignment with FENCA’s harmonizing goals and their contribution to consumer protection. Situated within broader debates on self-regulation and soft law, the findings reveal considerable variation across national codes and limited evidence of meaningful enforcement, transparency, or consumer involvement. Despite FENCA’s federative framework, most CoC fall short of providing credible regulatory alternatives to public enforcement. The article concludes that these instruments remain symbolically important but normatively weak without significant reform.</p>

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Beyond Soft Law? Evaluating the Role of Codes of Conduct in Regulating EU Informal Debt Collection—Evidence from FENCA Members

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月3日

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  • Cătălin-Gabriel Stănescu,
  • Jakub Kepinski

摘要

This article investigates the role of industry codes of conduct (CoC) in regulating abusive informal debt collection within the EU. Focusing on national associations affiliated with the Federation of European National Collection Associations (FENCA), it evaluates the extent to which these codes function as effective self-regulation tools. Through a three-stage analysis—content review, benchmarking of code quality, and examination of enforcement practices—the study assesses their alignment with FENCA’s harmonizing goals and their contribution to consumer protection. Situated within broader debates on self-regulation and soft law, the findings reveal considerable variation across national codes and limited evidence of meaningful enforcement, transparency, or consumer involvement. Despite FENCA’s federative framework, most CoC fall short of providing credible regulatory alternatives to public enforcement. The article concludes that these instruments remain symbolically important but normatively weak without significant reform.