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<p>Hayek’s “road to serfdom” concern is often discussed in terms of fiscal expansion. We argue that the relevant margin is instead the implementation form of welfare provision: case-by-case administrative discretion versus general, prospective rules. Drawing on Hayek’s critique of comprehensive planning in <i>The Road to Serfdom</i> and his later rule-of-law criteria in <i>The Constitution of Liberty</i> and <i>Law, Legislation and Liberty</i>, we develop a dynamic political-economy model that isolates the institutional conditions under which implementation form, rather than fiscal scale, generates selection pressure toward discretionary rule. Voters weigh perceived operational gains from administrative governance (speed and fine-grained targeting) against expected policy-error losses under information-intensive administration and citizen-borne process costs (opacity, red tape, weaker avenues for appeal). Greater reliance on instruments that require case-by-case judgment (such as exemptions, waivers, and individualized transfers) increases the probability of electing discretionary politicians, especially when problems become salient and implementation is knowledge intensive. In repeated competition, electoral incentives can encourage the introduction of further exceptions that accumulate over time, generating upward drift in discretion absent binding constraints. State capacity has ambiguous effects: it reduces policy error but can also increase the effectiveness of discretionary control. We then analyze constitutional meta-rules requiring generality, automaticity, and independent review. These rules cap the probability of selecting discretionary politicians even during crises and other high-salience events, without limiting aggregate fiscal size, and they channel policy toward universal, formula-based programs. The framework clarifies conditions under which large welfare states remain compatible with liberal constitutional order.</p>

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When does a welfare state become a road to serfdom? A model of discretion, knowledge, and political selection

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月21日

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  • Niclas Berggren

摘要

Hayek’s “road to serfdom” concern is often discussed in terms of fiscal expansion. We argue that the relevant margin is instead the implementation form of welfare provision: case-by-case administrative discretion versus general, prospective rules. Drawing on Hayek’s critique of comprehensive planning in The Road to Serfdom and his later rule-of-law criteria in The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty, we develop a dynamic political-economy model that isolates the institutional conditions under which implementation form, rather than fiscal scale, generates selection pressure toward discretionary rule. Voters weigh perceived operational gains from administrative governance (speed and fine-grained targeting) against expected policy-error losses under information-intensive administration and citizen-borne process costs (opacity, red tape, weaker avenues for appeal). Greater reliance on instruments that require case-by-case judgment (such as exemptions, waivers, and individualized transfers) increases the probability of electing discretionary politicians, especially when problems become salient and implementation is knowledge intensive. In repeated competition, electoral incentives can encourage the introduction of further exceptions that accumulate over time, generating upward drift in discretion absent binding constraints. State capacity has ambiguous effects: it reduces policy error but can also increase the effectiveness of discretionary control. We then analyze constitutional meta-rules requiring generality, automaticity, and independent review. These rules cap the probability of selecting discretionary politicians even during crises and other high-salience events, without limiting aggregate fiscal size, and they channel policy toward universal, formula-based programs. The framework clarifies conditions under which large welfare states remain compatible with liberal constitutional order.