Scholarlink

<p>Left-leaning populist regimes in 21st-century Latin America have become notoriously long, including some that maintained their power by repealing term limits. Along with changes in external factors, we argue that repealing term limits allowed populist leaders to develop longer time horizons and behave more like stationary than roving bandits. We show that, relative to those constrained by time limits, unconstrained populist leaders mitigate the economic effects of the populist cycle of boom, stagnation, and bust. Populists constrained by term limits act like roving bandits, engaging in more extractive rent-seeking that leads to more significant economic fluctuations.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

The political economy of populism regime length

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月17日

查看全文
  • João Pedro Bastos,
  • Nicolas Cachanosky,
  • Tomás Faintich

摘要

Left-leaning populist regimes in 21st-century Latin America have become notoriously long, including some that maintained their power by repealing term limits. Along with changes in external factors, we argue that repealing term limits allowed populist leaders to develop longer time horizons and behave more like stationary than roving bandits. We show that, relative to those constrained by time limits, unconstrained populist leaders mitigate the economic effects of the populist cycle of boom, stagnation, and bust. Populists constrained by term limits act like roving bandits, engaging in more extractive rent-seeking that leads to more significant economic fluctuations.