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<p>Scholars have generally taken a negative view of the inclusion of secession rights in federal constitutions. Adopting a <i>constitutional political economy</i> perspective, we challenge this consensus by highlighting the critical role that the right to secession can play in enforcing a federal bargain in the face of significant political imbalance among federal sub-units. We demonstrate that the inclusion of a secession right can allow for unanimous constitutional agreement to the formation of a federation in circumstances in which such agreement cannot be reached on a federation without a right to secession, even if union is potentially in the interests of all members.</p>

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Federalism, political imbalance, and the right to secession

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年1月29日

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  • Bahar Leventoglu,
  • Georg Vanberg,
  • Alessandra Waggoner

摘要

Scholars have generally taken a negative view of the inclusion of secession rights in federal constitutions. Adopting a constitutional political economy perspective, we challenge this consensus by highlighting the critical role that the right to secession can play in enforcing a federal bargain in the face of significant political imbalance among federal sub-units. We demonstrate that the inclusion of a secession right can allow for unanimous constitutional agreement to the formation of a federation in circumstances in which such agreement cannot be reached on a federation without a right to secession, even if union is potentially in the interests of all members.