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<p>Fifth-generation (5G) network technology is not just an improved extension of the fourth generation; it possesses several key properties, including high capacity, network slicing, low latency, high throughput, and network virtualisation. 5G aims to provide a better quality network. Users can access a variety of web services from any location at any time, thanks to rapid advances in wireless communication technologies and the increasing popularity of mobile devices. To provide secure communication, numerous schemes have been developed using the elliptic curve and problems based on the hardness of integer factorisation. However, these problems can be solved by quantum computers in polynomial time. Hence, these protocols are no longer safe on quantum computers. This article proposes a quantum-safe and efficient 5G cross-network slice authentication scheme to counter quantum adversaries. We have used the CSIDH-based key-exchange protocol to enhance its security against quantum attacks. To prevent slice impersonation during the context transfer, we have given a lightweight inter-slice trust subroutine based on mutual authentication with short-lived credentials. This scheme is based on the mathematical hard problem of computing the action of an ideal over an elliptic curve, which is a Diffie-Hellman commutative isogeny problem (CSIDH). The security of the protocol is proved on the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) model. Furthermore, a comparison of all possible post-quantum 5G solutions has been made using key exchange protocols such as Kyber, Classic McEliece and SPHINCS + 5G.</p>

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CSIDH-based quantum-safe authentication protocol for cross-slice communication in 5G networks

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月24日

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  • Sweta Mishra,
  • Rishi Kumar Jha,
  • Bhaskar Mondal

摘要

Fifth-generation (5G) network technology is not just an improved extension of the fourth generation; it possesses several key properties, including high capacity, network slicing, low latency, high throughput, and network virtualisation. 5G aims to provide a better quality network. Users can access a variety of web services from any location at any time, thanks to rapid advances in wireless communication technologies and the increasing popularity of mobile devices. To provide secure communication, numerous schemes have been developed using the elliptic curve and problems based on the hardness of integer factorisation. However, these problems can be solved by quantum computers in polynomial time. Hence, these protocols are no longer safe on quantum computers. This article proposes a quantum-safe and efficient 5G cross-network slice authentication scheme to counter quantum adversaries. We have used the CSIDH-based key-exchange protocol to enhance its security against quantum attacks. To prevent slice impersonation during the context transfer, we have given a lightweight inter-slice trust subroutine based on mutual authentication with short-lived credentials. This scheme is based on the mathematical hard problem of computing the action of an ideal over an elliptic curve, which is a Diffie-Hellman commutative isogeny problem (CSIDH). The security of the protocol is proved on the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway (BPR) model. Furthermore, a comparison of all possible post-quantum 5G solutions has been made using key exchange protocols such as Kyber, Classic McEliece and SPHINCS + 5G.