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<p>The splitting attack is one of the most important attacks on the blockchain, in the first place for Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols. Currently, there are no explicit analytical formulas for evaluating its success probability, which causes some distrust in blockchain technologies. In this article, for a simplified (but still not simple) model of a splitting attack, the recurrent formulas allowing the evaluation of the exact values of the probability that an attacker will be able to build a branch of a given length are obtained. The correctness of these formulas is verified through numerical examples using the Monte Carlo method by constructing estimates with a specified confidence level and relative error.</p>

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Simulating a Simplified Version of a Splitting Attack on the Blockchain Based on the Proof-of-Stake Consensus Protocol

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月1日

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  • L. V. Kovalchuk,
  • M. Yu. Kuznetsov,
  • A. A. Shumska

摘要

The splitting attack is one of the most important attacks on the blockchain, in the first place for Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols. Currently, there are no explicit analytical formulas for evaluating its success probability, which causes some distrust in blockchain technologies. In this article, for a simplified (but still not simple) model of a splitting attack, the recurrent formulas allowing the evaluation of the exact values of the probability that an attacker will be able to build a branch of a given length are obtained. The correctness of these formulas is verified through numerical examples using the Monte Carlo method by constructing estimates with a specified confidence level and relative error.