Exo-autopoietic bodies: the quest for the theoretical identity of living beings

Despite the encyclopedic knowledge accumulated in contemporary biology, it is still frustratingly elusive to find an uncontroversial answer to the (apparently) simple question, “What are living beings?” Since the traditional approach to answering this question has been by means of definitions, it has been pointed out that an alternative might be to change the strategy and, following the example of other sciences, try to find not a definition but a theoretical identity for living beings. However, according to some critics, such a move is neither possible nor advisable since current biology, limited to only earthly samples of life, does not have enough empirical basis and theoretical development to formulate a theoretical identity for living beings. In this paper, contrary to this diagnosis, I make room for and propose a theoretical identity statement for living beings. First, I argue that the limitations to proposing such an identity are not as severe as it is assumed. Second, I suggest answering the question, “What are living beings?” with the theoretical identity statement, ‘Living beings are exoautopoietic bodies.’ I explain this proposal’s theoretical grounds and defend it against potential objections.