<p>This article proposes a new account of the powers hypothesized by powers-based theories of causation. This account, the <i>rectangle model</i>, denies that powers are (1) identical to dispositions; (2) directed onto their manifestations; and (3) known through the dispositions identical to them. The rectangle model claims that (1) powers are fully determinate dynamic capacities which lack dispositional/causal profiles until they engage with other powers; (2) powers aren’t directed onto anything; (3) powers have intrinsic being despite their dynamic natures; (4) dispositions derive from powers; and (5) we know powers only indirectly through their contingent dispositional/causal outcomes.</p>

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Rethinking Causal Powers

  • Patrick Lewtas

摘要

This article proposes a new account of the powers hypothesized by powers-based theories of causation. This account, the rectangle model, denies that powers are (1) identical to dispositions; (2) directed onto their manifestations; and (3) known through the dispositions identical to them. The rectangle model claims that (1) powers are fully determinate dynamic capacities which lack dispositional/causal profiles until they engage with other powers; (2) powers aren’t directed onto anything; (3) powers have intrinsic being despite their dynamic natures; (4) dispositions derive from powers; and (5) we know powers only indirectly through their contingent dispositional/causal outcomes.