<p>This study investigates the relation between the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature and the judgment of taste, as articulated in Kant’s <i>Critique of the Power of Judgment</i>. It interprets three of Kant’s theses on this relation: the Identity Thesis, the Possibility Thesis, and the Reciprocity Thesis. (1) The transcendental principle of the power of judgment—namely, the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature, which guides scientific inquiry—comprises two elements: a “matter of fact” component (the specific constitution of the power of judgment) and a “requirement” component. Similarly, the principle of taste—the subjective principle of the power of judgment in general—has a comparable structure. When applied to cognition, this subjective principle manifests as the transcendental principle of the purposiveness of nature. In this respect, the two principles can be regarded as identical. (2) The judgment of taste is made possible by the principle of the formal purposiveness of nature, in that this principle provides the concept of the supersensible substratum of nature. The judgment of taste grounds its claim to universality through its relation to this concept. (3) Kant holds that the formation of beautiful objects in nature can be fully explained through mechanical laws alone. From this perspective, natural beauty cannot indicate a supersensible substratum of external nature. Consequently, it cannot support the principle that external nature conforms to our cognitive faculties. However, beauty—including the beauty of artworks—can, by virtue of the harmonious play of cognitive faculties it demonstrates, point to an internal purposiveness of these faculties in relation to each other.</p>