<p>This paper takes issue with Córdoba’s (Axiomathes 27(5):521–529, 2017) attempt to axiomatize praxeology, with the particular target being his ultimate derivation of the Scarcity Theorem. This author starts with proving the Uneasiness Theorem, a proof we find flawless. It is indeed the case that action entails wanting something, from which it follows – by contraposition – that being satisfied (i.e. not wanting anything) entails no action. That much must be granted. However, we consider the author’s alleged proof of the Scarcity Theorem wanting. Specifically, what we find unpersuasive is Córdoba’s premise (9) having it that if there is nothing that is scarce for <i>a</i> (some arbitrary economic agent), then <i>a</i> is satisfied and therefore <i>a</i> does not (and cannot) act. On Córdoba’s own definition of scarcity, scarcity is a <i>relational</i> property. To wit, a certain resource is scarce for <i>a</i> when it does not suffice to satisfy <i>a</i>’s multiple ends. But then, while sticking to this definition, we envisage a situation wherein nothing is scarce for <i>a</i> (relative to his ends). It seems that even under this scenario, the economic actor may <i>not</i> be satisfied <i>just yet</i> (say, at time t₁). Yet, he may start sequentially employing his adequate means to satisfy his ends, thus obeying the law of diminishing marginal utility with both his desires and beliefs issuing in the purposeful behavior in question, nothing short of action proper. If our thought experiments counts for something, it shows that scarcity is just a contingent – <i>pace</i> Mises (Human action, 4th edn. Fox &amp; Wilkes, San Francisco, p. 70, 1949) and Córdoba – rather than a necessary condition of action.</p>