Two Logical Senses of ‘Argument’
摘要
What is an argument? This foundational question in argumentation research cannot be answered univocally, because ‘argument’ is ambiguous. This paper has two goals. The first is to draw attention to a neglected distinction between two ordinary ‘logical’ senses of the term: an ‘objective’ and a ‘subjective’ one. The second is to define these senses. In the objective sense, an argument for (or against) a certain proposition is a reason for (or against) believing that proposition. In the subjective sense, it is a consideration intended to provide such a reason. After defining these two senses, the paper defends these definitions against several objections. In this connection, I argue, among other things, that conclusions are not internal parts of arguments; that premises and conclusions are not ‘speech acts’; that the subjective sense of ‘argument’ is robust against the charge of relativism; and that considerations can deserve the name ‘argument’ even if they do not provide actual support.