The Fallacy of Unbeatable Force
摘要
This article aims to characterize the fallacy of unbeatable force as an argument whose flawed structure grants an illusion of invulnerability to a phenomenon or entity whose power is perceived in an exaggerated manner by the subject, thereby inducing their subordination. First, its philosophical roots are explored in the thought of Thomas Hobbes, particularly in Leviathan, where the notion of omnipotent authority plays a central role. The argument that defines this fallacy is then presented and formalized, allowing for an initial characterization of it as a material fallacy—one whose flaw lies in the content of its premises rather than in its structure. However, given the limitations of traditional conceptions of fallacies, this study will be complemented by contemporary approaches, such as epistemic, dialectical, and dialogical perspectives, which help to understand the functioning and implications of the fallacy of unbeatable force in broader argumentative contexts. Finally, the analysis is expanded in light of emerging neurocognitive approaches, which suggest that the fallacy in question transcends its discursive dimension, manifesting as a cognitive mechanism of (self)subordination and long-term control. This mechanism operates as a dual shield: on the one hand, it withdraws subjects, overprotecting them; on the other, it safeguards the entity to which superior power is attributed from any critical scrutiny, thereby reinforcing its dominant position.