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<p>This paper examines two interconnected challenges in Renewable Energy Communities (REC) optimization: investment in renewable technologies and equitable sharing of incentives, usually offered by a central authority. Focusing on a REC under the so-called <i>virtual framework</i> and composed of a household and a biogas producer — common in rural and urban contexts — we analyze how investment decisions and incentive-sharing mechanisms impact community profitability and self-consumption. The household invests in photovoltaic panels to reduce energy purchases and monetize surplus generation, while the biogas producer either converts biogas into electricity or sells it on the gas market. We model this interaction as a leader-follower problem: an administrator (leader) defines the incentive-sharing rule, while a household and a biogas producer (followers) determine their optimal investments. Modeling the objective of the leader as a Nash bargaining problem and a Nash equilibrium for the followers’ static game, we provide model-based insights into efficient REC design and policy implications for fostering sustainable community energy systems. The model is applied to this stylized case of a REC, under realistic data about the random variables and investment costs. We obtain structural insights into how specific incentive policies and members’ investment decisions interact within this specialized configuration, highlighting trade-offs that can guide the strategic organization of similar community energy frameworks.</p>

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Optimal investment and fair sharing rules of incentives in virtual renewable energy communities

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年8月4日

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  • Almendra Awerkin,
  • Paolo Falbo,
  • Tiziano Vargiolu

摘要

This paper examines two interconnected challenges in Renewable Energy Communities (REC) optimization: investment in renewable technologies and equitable sharing of incentives, usually offered by a central authority. Focusing on a REC under the so-called virtual framework and composed of a household and a biogas producer — common in rural and urban contexts — we analyze how investment decisions and incentive-sharing mechanisms impact community profitability and self-consumption. The household invests in photovoltaic panels to reduce energy purchases and monetize surplus generation, while the biogas producer either converts biogas into electricity or sells it on the gas market. We model this interaction as a leader-follower problem: an administrator (leader) defines the incentive-sharing rule, while a household and a biogas producer (followers) determine their optimal investments. Modeling the objective of the leader as a Nash bargaining problem and a Nash equilibrium for the followers’ static game, we provide model-based insights into efficient REC design and policy implications for fostering sustainable community energy systems. The model is applied to this stylized case of a REC, under realistic data about the random variables and investment costs. We obtain structural insights into how specific incentive policies and members’ investment decisions interact within this specialized configuration, highlighting trade-offs that can guide the strategic organization of similar community energy frameworks.