<p>Cosmetic quality standards for produce lead to food loss, especially in decentralized agricultural supply chains where retailers impose stringent cosmetic requirements. Decentralization shifts the responsibility for improving cosmetic quality to farmers, whose financial constraints limit effort investment and exacerbate food loss. To address these problems, we introduce buyer financing and examine how it, together with decentralization, affects decisions, profits and food loss in contract-farming supply chains under cosmetic standards. We develop a game-theoretic Stackelberg model to characterize retailer–farmer interactions and derive equilibrium outcomes. First, we find that a high price premium for high-standard produce induces the retailer to opt for selling high-standard produce; otherwise, it chooses a low-standard strategy. In particular, stringent cosmetic standards can lead to less food loss when the price premium is sufficiently high. Second, compared to the centralized supply chain, the decentralized supply chain makes the retailer more likely to opt for selling low-standard produce, and although it leads to lower farmer effort and supply chain profit, it can, counterintuitively, yield less food loss. Third, buyer financing makes the retailer more likely to sell high-standard produce. While buyer financing increases farmer effort and supply chain profit, it surprisingly can also increase food loss and force the retailer to increase wholesale price under certain conditions. This study uncovers the role of supply chain decentralization and buyer financing in agricultural supply chains under cosmetic standards, and provides actionable guidance for managers and policy makers, particularly when prioritizing food loss as a core supply chain performance metric.</p>