Scholarlink

<p>This paper examines the coopetition strategies of new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers in a oligopoly market under the dual credit policy (DCP), utilizing a game model to analyze four strategies: R&amp;D competition, R&amp;D cooperation, RJV competition, and RJV cooperation. The results show that: (1) Government subsidies can effectively stimulate R&amp;D investments and boost production, but the subsidy policy is not always consistent with firms’ optimal strategies. (2) From the perspective of subsidies and profits, the RJV competition strategy outperforms both the RJV cooperation and R&amp;D cooperation strategies. Moreover, as technological spillovers increase, the R&amp;D competition strategy evolves into a suboptimal strategy. (3) From the perspective of technological achievements, outputs, and social welfare, the RJV competition and RJV cooperation strategies are equivalent and superior to the R&amp;D competition and R&amp;D cooperation strategies. (4) Under the optimal strategy, R&amp;D investments, outputs, profits, and social welfare increase with rising range impact factors. However, the effect of the number of firms is contingent upon R&amp;D efficiency. Thus, the government should implement dynamic subsidy policies, encourage technology sharing, enhance market competition, and improve infrastructure to support the NEV sector.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

​​Strategic coopetition among oligopolistic automakers under the dual credit policy: incorporating subsidies and preferences

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月8日

查看全文
  • Chuanji Wang,
  • Kaifu Yuan

摘要

This paper examines the coopetition strategies of new energy vehicle (NEV) manufacturers in a oligopoly market under the dual credit policy (DCP), utilizing a game model to analyze four strategies: R&D competition, R&D cooperation, RJV competition, and RJV cooperation. The results show that: (1) Government subsidies can effectively stimulate R&D investments and boost production, but the subsidy policy is not always consistent with firms’ optimal strategies. (2) From the perspective of subsidies and profits, the RJV competition strategy outperforms both the RJV cooperation and R&D cooperation strategies. Moreover, as technological spillovers increase, the R&D competition strategy evolves into a suboptimal strategy. (3) From the perspective of technological achievements, outputs, and social welfare, the RJV competition and RJV cooperation strategies are equivalent and superior to the R&D competition and R&D cooperation strategies. (4) Under the optimal strategy, R&D investments, outputs, profits, and social welfare increase with rising range impact factors. However, the effect of the number of firms is contingent upon R&D efficiency. Thus, the government should implement dynamic subsidy policies, encourage technology sharing, enhance market competition, and improve infrastructure to support the NEV sector.