<p>The rising popularity of e-commerce is attracting many manufacturers and their traditional offline retailers to online sales. However, as the entry rules highlight that downstream online selling requires upstream authorization, this study investigates a manufacturer’s decisions on channel selection and whether to authorize the retailer to sell online. We consider a multi-stage Stackelberg game that involves a hybrid e-commerce platform, a brand manufacturer, and a traditional retailer. The manufacturer determines (1) whether and how to sell online and (2) whether to authorize the retailer to sell online. The results show that the manufacturer with his dominance in authorization selects the reselling channel if the online selling cost is moderate, and the agency channel otherwise. However, the manufacturer does not allow the retailer to sell online, given the intense competition among online channels, if the selling cost is low and the referral fee rate is high, even though the retailer benefits from authorization in terms of reduced double marginalization. Moreover, considering the possibility that firms may have different strategic positions and the manufacturer may charge a licensing fee, this study is extended to identify the effects of (1) the platform’s dominance in determining whether to provide the manufacturer with a reselling channel, (2) the retailer’s dominance in determining whether to allow the manufacturer to sell online, and (3) the existence of a licensing fee. Our findings provide important practical implications for firms seeking to expand their presence online.</p>