<p>As climate change increases the climate risk of farmers’ production and brings challenges to agricultural sustainable development, agricultural insurance products in agricultural green production have become more and more popular. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of two subsidy policies: the agricultural insurance subsidy (AIS) policy and the green investment subsidy (GIS) policy, on a contract-farming supply chain where the farmer adopts the green production technology to reduce agrochemical inputs and distributes through the agro-dealer. The results indicate that climate risk leads to lower farm size and green technology input, which harms agricultural green production. Further analysis shows that although both AIS and GIS policies are effective in boosting green investment, the farmer under AIS (GIS) invests more in green technology than under GIS (AIS), when the agricultural production faces low (high) climate risk. In addition, AIS achieves higher profit for farmers and the agro-dealer than GIS, and AIS always motivates farmers to plant more acres. The results also show that, when the damage of farmers’ production to the environment is relatively low, GIS generates higher social welfare compared to AIS. However, the social welfare under AIS is higher if the environmental damage of their production is relatively high.</p>