<p>Online disputes on e-commerce platforms have typically been resolved by the platforms themselves, i.e., through the platform arbitration mechanism, which is often perceived to be biased. The emerging expert review mechanism resolves disputes by employing expert panels for judgments. This work determines the preferred online dispute resolution mechanisms under different conditions to handle online disputes between manufacturers and consumers. A live-streaming e-commerce supply chain, which includes an e-commerce platform, a manufacturer, and a host, is considered. Profit maximization models for the platform, the manufacturer and the host are formulated as Stackelberg game models under the platform arbitration and the expert review mechanisms. The results indicate that the choice of an online dispute resolution mechanism for an e-commerce platform primarily depends on the commissions charged to, and the penalties imposed on, the manufacturer. The expert review mechanism can eliminate subjective decision biases, motivate the host, and increase the market demand. In contrast, the platform arbitration mechanism can set higher quality standards, prompt manufacturers to improve product quality, and improve consumer surplus. The research findings provide valuable managerial insights for online dispute governance and industry development for e-commerce platforms.</p>

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Platform arbitration or expert review? Online dispute resolution mechanisms for e-commerce platforms with live-streaming sales channels

  • Zhong-Zhong Jiang,
  • Zhining Jiang,
  • Jiarun Guo,
  • Minghe Sun

摘要

Online disputes on e-commerce platforms have typically been resolved by the platforms themselves, i.e., through the platform arbitration mechanism, which is often perceived to be biased. The emerging expert review mechanism resolves disputes by employing expert panels for judgments. This work determines the preferred online dispute resolution mechanisms under different conditions to handle online disputes between manufacturers and consumers. A live-streaming e-commerce supply chain, which includes an e-commerce platform, a manufacturer, and a host, is considered. Profit maximization models for the platform, the manufacturer and the host are formulated as Stackelberg game models under the platform arbitration and the expert review mechanisms. The results indicate that the choice of an online dispute resolution mechanism for an e-commerce platform primarily depends on the commissions charged to, and the penalties imposed on, the manufacturer. The expert review mechanism can eliminate subjective decision biases, motivate the host, and increase the market demand. In contrast, the platform arbitration mechanism can set higher quality standards, prompt manufacturers to improve product quality, and improve consumer surplus. The research findings provide valuable managerial insights for online dispute governance and industry development for e-commerce platforms.