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<p>Several governments aim to reduce greenhouse emissions. In the transportation sector, deployment of electric vehicles (EVs) has been proven to be an effective way to reduce emissions. However, the rate of deployment of EVs has been observed to be considerably slow in many developing countries. In this research, we explore the role of government policies in EV and gasoline vehicle (GV) manufacturing. We develop a sequential game in which the government moves first and imposes taxes on GV manufacturers and provides subsidy to EV manufacturers. GV and EV manufacturers next move simultaneously and decide the price of GV and EV vehicles respectively. We demonstrate our model for a case study of the city of Chandigarh, India. Our results show that the realized demand of EV exceeds that of GV at optimality. We also show that in the long run, the demand for EV shall further exceed that of GV. The current price of EV is however seen to exceed the current price of GV. The government as well as the manufacturers of GV and EV were all found to be profitable and hence our model provides a win–win situation for all the players in the game. We also perform sensitivity analysis of the model parameters. Our results indicate that increasing the number of EV charging stations shall further enhance the deployment of EVs. We also find that our model has scope to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 4.7%.</p>

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Impact of government policy of taxation and subsidy to enhance deployment of electric vehicles: analysis of price and demand—case study of Chandigarh, India

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月9日

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  • Mohd Vaseem,
  • Sri Vanamalla Venkataraman

摘要

Several governments aim to reduce greenhouse emissions. In the transportation sector, deployment of electric vehicles (EVs) has been proven to be an effective way to reduce emissions. However, the rate of deployment of EVs has been observed to be considerably slow in many developing countries. In this research, we explore the role of government policies in EV and gasoline vehicle (GV) manufacturing. We develop a sequential game in which the government moves first and imposes taxes on GV manufacturers and provides subsidy to EV manufacturers. GV and EV manufacturers next move simultaneously and decide the price of GV and EV vehicles respectively. We demonstrate our model for a case study of the city of Chandigarh, India. Our results show that the realized demand of EV exceeds that of GV at optimality. We also show that in the long run, the demand for EV shall further exceed that of GV. The current price of EV is however seen to exceed the current price of GV. The government as well as the manufacturers of GV and EV were all found to be profitable and hence our model provides a win–win situation for all the players in the game. We also perform sensitivity analysis of the model parameters. Our results indicate that increasing the number of EV charging stations shall further enhance the deployment of EVs. We also find that our model has scope to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 4.7%.