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<p>Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, (Horan and Sprumont, Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 521–537 <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2022</CitationRef>) proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of <span>Agenda Control</span>, <span>Coalition Manipulation</span>, <span>Possible Winner</span>, <span>Necessary Winner</span>, and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.</p>

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On the complexity of the two-stage majoritarian rule

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月27日

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  • Yongjie Yang

摘要

Sequential voting rules have played a crucial role in shaping decisions within parliamentary and legislative frameworks. After observing that the existing sequential rules fail several fundamental axioms, (Horan and Sprumont, Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 521–537 2022) proposed a sequential rule named two-stage majoritarian rule (TSMR). This paper examines this rule by investigating the complexity of Agenda Control, Coalition Manipulation, Possible Winner, Necessary Winner, and eight standard election control problems. Our study offers a comprehensive insight into the complexity landscape of these problems.