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Aim <p>No international organization has a comprehensive register or global oversight of Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3)/BSL-4 laboratories. Different countries use different standards for designation of pathogens and laboratories. This study aimed to investigate the global geospatial distribution of BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories to inform biosafety efforts.</p> Subject and methodology <p>Publicly available data were used to collect data on BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories globally. Further details of each laboratory, including the locations (i.e., latitude/longitude coordinates) and pathogens worked on, were collected manually from Google Maps and the official Web pages of laboratories, respectively. The most recent and highest biosafety level was used to classify the laboratories as BSL3 or BSL4. Other, country-level indicators were analyzed and were collected from the World Bank, the Worldometer, and the 2021 Global Health Security Index Report. The presence of dual-use research concerns guidelines in a country was reviewed for each country reporting at least one BSL-3 laboratory.</p> Results <p>We identified 3515 BSL-3 laboratories in 149 countries, with nearly half (47.1%) in the United States. Details on geolocations and pathogens they handled are publicly available for 955 of these labs. The United Kingdom had the highest rate (<i>N</i> = 9) of BSL-3 labs per million population, while Bangladesh had the lowest. High-income countries house 82% of these laboratories. There are 110 BSL-4 laboratories in 34 middle- and high-income countries, and 46% are in the WHO’s Europe region. Notably, from the health security index perspective, 91.6% of countries with at least one BSL-3 laboratory lack guidelines for dual-use research of concern.</p> Conclusion <p>BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories are unevenly distributed by income level, population density, and health security index. More than 90% of the countries with at least one BSL3 laboratory have no oversight/regulations regarding dual-use research. This study can inform future global governance efforts to improve biosafety.</p>

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Mapping biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) and BSL-4 laboratories for public health threats reduction

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月20日

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  • Atalay Goshu Muluneh,
  • Aye Moa,
  • Samsung Lim,
  • Chandini Raina MacIntyre

摘要

Aim

No international organization has a comprehensive register or global oversight of Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3)/BSL-4 laboratories. Different countries use different standards for designation of pathogens and laboratories. This study aimed to investigate the global geospatial distribution of BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories to inform biosafety efforts.

Subject and methodology

Publicly available data were used to collect data on BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories globally. Further details of each laboratory, including the locations (i.e., latitude/longitude coordinates) and pathogens worked on, were collected manually from Google Maps and the official Web pages of laboratories, respectively. The most recent and highest biosafety level was used to classify the laboratories as BSL3 or BSL4. Other, country-level indicators were analyzed and were collected from the World Bank, the Worldometer, and the 2021 Global Health Security Index Report. The presence of dual-use research concerns guidelines in a country was reviewed for each country reporting at least one BSL-3 laboratory.

Results

We identified 3515 BSL-3 laboratories in 149 countries, with nearly half (47.1%) in the United States. Details on geolocations and pathogens they handled are publicly available for 955 of these labs. The United Kingdom had the highest rate (N = 9) of BSL-3 labs per million population, while Bangladesh had the lowest. High-income countries house 82% of these laboratories. There are 110 BSL-4 laboratories in 34 middle- and high-income countries, and 46% are in the WHO’s Europe region. Notably, from the health security index perspective, 91.6% of countries with at least one BSL-3 laboratory lack guidelines for dual-use research of concern.

Conclusion

BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories are unevenly distributed by income level, population density, and health security index. More than 90% of the countries with at least one BSL3 laboratory have no oversight/regulations regarding dual-use research. This study can inform future global governance efforts to improve biosafety.