<p>This policy paper takes stock of post-election trends in the EU’s China policy, assessing them against the backdrop of experiences of EU-China interaction across the past decade and in view of the prospects they bear for EU-China relations over the next few years. Since the elections, the European Parliament has strengthened its criticism of China’s human rights record and its explicit EU support for Taiwan, while the incoming Commissioners tend to highlight China’s role as a competitor and rival to the EU, with a focus on specific instances of problematic and unfair behaviour on its part. The paper argues that past experience suggests that Beijing is generally ready to engage and negotiate on specific grievances, especially when they are in the economic or technical sphere. By contrast, policies that are seen as violating Chinese sovereignty are met with strong rhetorical rebuttal and often harsh countermeasures. Since it is not imaginable for the EU to abandon a critical engagement with China in the normative sphere, the paper recommends strategies for defusing related rhetoric while developing a proactive agenda of pragmatic engagement, both with regard to economic interests and issues of international governance. Especially with a more hostile US administration under Trump II, it will be crucial for the EU to develop solid ties with China.</p>

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The risks of continuity—pitfalls of the EU’s policy stance on China after the European elections of 2024

  • Frank Gaenssmantel

摘要

This policy paper takes stock of post-election trends in the EU’s China policy, assessing them against the backdrop of experiences of EU-China interaction across the past decade and in view of the prospects they bear for EU-China relations over the next few years. Since the elections, the European Parliament has strengthened its criticism of China’s human rights record and its explicit EU support for Taiwan, while the incoming Commissioners tend to highlight China’s role as a competitor and rival to the EU, with a focus on specific instances of problematic and unfair behaviour on its part. The paper argues that past experience suggests that Beijing is generally ready to engage and negotiate on specific grievances, especially when they are in the economic or technical sphere. By contrast, policies that are seen as violating Chinese sovereignty are met with strong rhetorical rebuttal and often harsh countermeasures. Since it is not imaginable for the EU to abandon a critical engagement with China in the normative sphere, the paper recommends strategies for defusing related rhetoric while developing a proactive agenda of pragmatic engagement, both with regard to economic interests and issues of international governance. Especially with a more hostile US administration under Trump II, it will be crucial for the EU to develop solid ties with China.