<p>The presence of counterfeit GNSS signals, commonly referred to as spoofing, poses an increasing threat to the integrity of modern navigation systems. These spoofing attacks can deceive receivers into processing false signals, resulting in inaccurate position and time data. A simple yet effective method for spoofing detection is by using two separate receivers and computing the double difference (DD) of carrier-phase measurements. The DD provides angle of arrival (AOA) information, which helps classify whether a satellite signal is genuine or spoofing. Building on this idea, we propose an improved dual-antenna GNSS spoofing detection technique. Instead of using carrier phase measurements to compute the DD, our approach relies on carrier-smoothed code pseudoranges. This eliminates the need to resolve integer ambiguities inherent in carrier phase-based DD calculations. Experimental results on a mixed tracking dataset consisting of authentic and spoofing satellites demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method.</p>

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Enhancing GNSS spoofing detection by carrier-smoothing pseudorange double difference measurements

  • Hiep Van Hoang,
  • Hieu Quang Pham,
  • Hien Van Nguyen,
  • Thuan Dinh Nguyen,
  • Vinh The La,
  • Tung Hai Ta,
  • Hung Pham Ngoc

摘要

The presence of counterfeit GNSS signals, commonly referred to as spoofing, poses an increasing threat to the integrity of modern navigation systems. These spoofing attacks can deceive receivers into processing false signals, resulting in inaccurate position and time data. A simple yet effective method for spoofing detection is by using two separate receivers and computing the double difference (DD) of carrier-phase measurements. The DD provides angle of arrival (AOA) information, which helps classify whether a satellite signal is genuine or spoofing. Building on this idea, we propose an improved dual-antenna GNSS spoofing detection technique. Instead of using carrier phase measurements to compute the DD, our approach relies on carrier-smoothed code pseudoranges. This eliminates the need to resolve integer ambiguities inherent in carrier phase-based DD calculations. Experimental results on a mixed tracking dataset consisting of authentic and spoofing satellites demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method.