GNSS performance degradation under meaconing in civil aviation: pseudorange and position models
摘要
With the escalating prevalence of in-band interference, the vulnerability of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers to potential jamming or spoofing threats has become a critical concern. The proliferation of GNSS repeaters, commonly known as meaconers (electronic devices that intercept GNSS signals, amplify them, and subsequently rebroadcast them) contributes to this threat landscape, by compromising GNSS accuracy, availability, continuity, and integrity. Specifically, the performance of standardized aviation receivers might be degraded when exposed to meaconing interference, causing critical yet unknown safety issues. This study assesses the robustness against meaconing, by evaluating the behavior of the checks performed by a certified aviation receiver. Firstly, the precise mathematical models of the GNSS observables (code, phase, smoothed pseudoranges, and carrier-to-noise density ratio