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<p>Trade in agricultural and food products in West Africa has two important characteristics: first, official statistics significantly underestimate it; second, it is impeded by administrative harassment in the form of checkpoints organized by public officials and the payment of bribes. We present two databases that focus on both issues. The ECO-ICBT database collects data on informal and formal agricultural and food trade between Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries along the main corridors in the region and shows that this trade is much higher than official statistics indicate: a systematic comparison of data from the ECO-ICBT database and the United Nations database, COMTRADE, supplied by national statistical institutes, reveals that in 2018, the COMTRADE database missed 84 percent of the total value of trade flows in the 33 products investigated by the ECO-ICBT database. The products most missed by COMTRADE are found to be cereals and livestock. We also present data collected between 2015 and 2020 on the time lost at checkpoints and the magnitude of bribes paid by transporters to public officials. These illicit practices corresponded in 2019 to an ad valorem tax on trade of 0.43% concerning the time lost at checkpoints and the payment of a bribe of USD 46 per ton of maize or USD 43 per ton of onions. We estimate the economic cost of these illicit practices with a partial equilibrium model calibrated to these data, taking the illustration of maize and onions. We conclude that ending these illicit practices in maize trade would increase consumer and producer surpluses in the region by USD 19&#xa0;million. For onions, the same estimate concludes that there would be a gain of USD 48.4&#xa0;million.</p>

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The economic costs of bribes and road harassment by officials in ECOWAS

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月27日

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  • Antoine Bouët,
  • Abdourahmane Sy,
  • Fousseini Traoré

摘要

Trade in agricultural and food products in West Africa has two important characteristics: first, official statistics significantly underestimate it; second, it is impeded by administrative harassment in the form of checkpoints organized by public officials and the payment of bribes. We present two databases that focus on both issues. The ECO-ICBT database collects data on informal and formal agricultural and food trade between Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries along the main corridors in the region and shows that this trade is much higher than official statistics indicate: a systematic comparison of data from the ECO-ICBT database and the United Nations database, COMTRADE, supplied by national statistical institutes, reveals that in 2018, the COMTRADE database missed 84 percent of the total value of trade flows in the 33 products investigated by the ECO-ICBT database. The products most missed by COMTRADE are found to be cereals and livestock. We also present data collected between 2015 and 2020 on the time lost at checkpoints and the magnitude of bribes paid by transporters to public officials. These illicit practices corresponded in 2019 to an ad valorem tax on trade of 0.43% concerning the time lost at checkpoints and the payment of a bribe of USD 46 per ton of maize or USD 43 per ton of onions. We estimate the economic cost of these illicit practices with a partial equilibrium model calibrated to these data, taking the illustration of maize and onions. We conclude that ending these illicit practices in maize trade would increase consumer and producer surpluses in the region by USD 19 million. For onions, the same estimate concludes that there would be a gain of USD 48.4 million.