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<p>For short-lifecycle products, online reviews of earlier versions become less informative. In response, digital platforms hosting these products adopt governance mechanisms that keep reviews timely and aligned with the current versions. In the mobile app context, one such mechanism conceals prior reviews whenever an app is updated and excludes them when deriving review-based measures of reputation. The concern is that by increasing search frictions, the mechanism may depress demand for some apps but not others. In this paper, we investigate how this concealing governance mechanism influences app demand. Using an instrumental variable approach, our results reveal asymmetrical impacts. We find that top-ranked free “superstar apps” tend to benefit from updating. Paid “non-superstar apps” are negatively impacted and the effect is primarily driven by higher-priced apps, while free ones only suffer if their prior review-based reputation was high. Our findings highlight how a platform governance mechanism results in redistributing demand. They also offer platforms and developers guidance on the implications of review-concealing policies.</p>

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Updating at the expense of demand? The case of platform apps

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月31日

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  • Wael Jabr,
  • Dominik Gutt,
  • Juergen Neumann,
  • Dennis Kundisch

摘要

For short-lifecycle products, online reviews of earlier versions become less informative. In response, digital platforms hosting these products adopt governance mechanisms that keep reviews timely and aligned with the current versions. In the mobile app context, one such mechanism conceals prior reviews whenever an app is updated and excludes them when deriving review-based measures of reputation. The concern is that by increasing search frictions, the mechanism may depress demand for some apps but not others. In this paper, we investigate how this concealing governance mechanism influences app demand. Using an instrumental variable approach, our results reveal asymmetrical impacts. We find that top-ranked free “superstar apps” tend to benefit from updating. Paid “non-superstar apps” are negatively impacted and the effect is primarily driven by higher-priced apps, while free ones only suffer if their prior review-based reputation was high. Our findings highlight how a platform governance mechanism results in redistributing demand. They also offer platforms and developers guidance on the implications of review-concealing policies.