<p>This paper studies a model of <i>n</i> insiders with perfect information trading on a risky asset with value normally distributed and disclosed at a random deadline. We propose a concept of information protocol equilibrium under semi-strong efficient pricing, consisting of an <i>n</i>–profile of insider trading strategies with terminal residual information protocols, and find that if a common protocol on terminal residual information before trading is obeyed by all insiders, then, in the market with more than two insiders there exists a uique equilibrium only when it requires to release common partial information eventually, or it does not exist if it requires to release all or not any; but in the market with a single insider, the insider may release all private information eventually to make a maximal profit. Thereby, the existence and uniqueness of information protocol equilibrium among <i>n</i> insiders are deduced. Finally, numerical results illustrate some market characteristics of equilibria with different information protocols required before trading.</p>