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<p>Database security remains fundamentally constrained by <i>static</i> defenses: fixed data locations and long-lived encryption keys give attackers a stationary target once perimeter defenses are breached. This paper makes three contributions toward an alternative, motion-based paradigm. First, we introduce the Database in Motion Chaos Encryption (DaChE) algorithm, in which AES-256-encrypted data shards are bound to balls that move through a Bunimovich stadium billiard, with decryption released only when a ball collides with a matching key-holding obstacle; a MapReduce-style pipeline aggregates the resulting partial query results. Second, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation and empirically validate the algorithm’s core chaotic-dynamics assumption, measuring a positive Lyapunov exponent (<InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\lambda = 0.47 \pm 0.17\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <mi>λ</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>0.47</mn> <mo>±</mo> <mn>0.17</mn> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> across 10 independent trials) and a corresponding key-sensitivity effect in which near-identical initial conditions rapidly diverge into unrelated collision sequences. Third, we report a transparent performance evaluation showing 22–100<InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\(\times \)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mo>×</mo> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> execution-time overhead relative to static AES-256 encryption for small configurations (3–5 shards) with only 50% convergence reliability within a fixed step budget, and we trace this unreliability to a specific, structural failure mode of the collision-detection process rather than an unexplained anomaly. These results indicate that, in its current unoptimized form, DaChE is a viable additional security layer for high-security, low-frequency access scenarios (e.g., audit logs, defense or medical records) rather than a general-purpose database mechanism, and we identify concrete algorithmic, complexity-reduction, and formal-security directions required before broader deployment.</p>

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DaChE: a proof-of-concept for chaos-based database security with dynamic data motion

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年8月4日

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  • Abraham Itzhak Weinberg

摘要

Database security remains fundamentally constrained by static defenses: fixed data locations and long-lived encryption keys give attackers a stationary target once perimeter defenses are breached. This paper makes three contributions toward an alternative, motion-based paradigm. First, we introduce the Database in Motion Chaos Encryption (DaChE) algorithm, in which AES-256-encrypted data shards are bound to balls that move through a Bunimovich stadium billiard, with decryption released only when a ball collides with a matching key-holding obstacle; a MapReduce-style pipeline aggregates the resulting partial query results. Second, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation and empirically validate the algorithm’s core chaotic-dynamics assumption, measuring a positive Lyapunov exponent ( \(\lambda = 0.47 \pm 0.17\) λ = 0.47 ± 0.17 across 10 independent trials) and a corresponding key-sensitivity effect in which near-identical initial conditions rapidly diverge into unrelated collision sequences. Third, we report a transparent performance evaluation showing 22–100 \(\times \) × execution-time overhead relative to static AES-256 encryption for small configurations (3–5 shards) with only 50% convergence reliability within a fixed step budget, and we trace this unreliability to a specific, structural failure mode of the collision-detection process rather than an unexplained anomaly. These results indicate that, in its current unoptimized form, DaChE is a viable additional security layer for high-security, low-frequency access scenarios (e.g., audit logs, defense or medical records) rather than a general-purpose database mechanism, and we identify concrete algorithmic, complexity-reduction, and formal-security directions required before broader deployment.