<p>Operations in high-hazard organizations (HHOs) are highly safe, highly hazardous, and highly significant for modern society. While HHOs are exposed to hazard events and operating at high risk of disasters, these organizations implement safety systems that support behaviors aimed at maintaining nearly error-free operations. This study examines paradoxical tensions in HHOs, focusing on how awareness of these tensions can inform managerial decision-making to prevent operational failures and address the signs of accidents. We adopted an instrumental case study of Daya Bay, a nuclear power plant, and an HHO to explore organizational behaviors and their impact on hazard management and accident prevention strategies. The case study of Daya Bay reveals how behaviors aimed at enhancing safety can paradoxically increase risk. HHOs’ intolerance toward failures, employment of advanced technologies, systemwide processing, redundancy, and bureaucracy can simultaneously enhance and hinder the organizational capacity to manage hazard events. Understanding these paradoxes is critical to improving organizational resilience. By understanding the paradoxes, organizations can develop more effective strategies to balance safety and operational demands. We provide practical implications for organizations seeking to enhance managerial decision-making, safety protocols, and organizational effectiveness and improve the overall organizational performance.</p>