Government regulations for medical supply shortages: the role of disease severity and consumer characteristics
摘要
Effective government intervention is critical for managing medical supply shortages during public health crises. This paper focuses on government measures to alleviate medical supply shortages across different infectious disease levels. In particular, we develop some Stackelberg game models that incorporate consumer risk preferences and disease-severity classifications to analyze the impacts of price controls and purchase restrictions on supply-chain performance under different policy scenarios. It is shown that supply-side price caps tent to compress manufacturers' profits but enhance equity by prioritizing access for vulnerable populations and reducing general shortage rates, albeit potentially increasing actual shortages due to reduced production incentives. Meanwhile, the efficacy of demand-side purchase limits is highly contingent on consumer psychology and practical constraints, leading to variable outcomes for profits and supply gaps. Both disease severity and policy type are critical determinants of supply-chain outcomes. Consequently, governments should tailor retail price ceilings to the specific disease level to optimize resource allocation and minimize overall shortages.