Scholarlink

<p>The objective of this paper is to analyze an incumbent–entrant model under uncertainty. The entrant observes the realization of the random variable(s) prior to making decisions regarding market entry and capacity selection, leaving the uncertainty entirely on the incumbent’s side. The sources of this uncertainty pertain to the characteristics of the entrant’s product and the entry costs the entrant must incur before becoming operational. The key findings indicate that uncertainty generally enhances entry, and, apart from <i>blockaded entry</i>, <i>entry deterrence</i> and <i>accommodated entry</i>, the incumbent can pursue <i>entry deterrence with a certain probability</i>.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Optimal entry deterrence under uncertainty

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月7日

查看全文
  • Richard F. Hartl,
  • Peter M. Kort,
  • Stefan Wrzaczek

摘要

The objective of this paper is to analyze an incumbent–entrant model under uncertainty. The entrant observes the realization of the random variable(s) prior to making decisions regarding market entry and capacity selection, leaving the uncertainty entirely on the incumbent’s side. The sources of this uncertainty pertain to the characteristics of the entrant’s product and the entry costs the entrant must incur before becoming operational. The key findings indicate that uncertainty generally enhances entry, and, apart from blockaded entry, entry deterrence and accommodated entry, the incumbent can pursue entry deterrence with a certain probability.