We consider the computation of an equilibrium of a stochastic Nash equilibrium problem, where the player objectives are assumed to be \(L_0\) -Lipschitz continuous and convex, given rival decisions with convex and closed player-specific feasibility sets. To address this problem, we consider minimizing a suitably defined value function defined using the Nikaido–Isoda function. Such an avenue does not necessitate either monotonicity properties of the concatenated gradient map or potentiality requirements on the game but does require a suitable regularity requirement under which a stationary point is a Nash equilibrium. We design and analyze a sampling-enabled projected-gradient-response method, reliant on inexact resolution of a player-level best-response subproblem. By deriving suitable Lipschitzian guarantees on the value function, we derive both asymptotic guarantees for the sequence of generated iterates as well as rate and complexity guarantees for computing a stationary point by appropriate choices of the sampling rate and inexactness sequence.
