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<p>We study a quantity-setting duopoly and a price-setting duopoly in which each firm has the option of disclosing or not its cost-reducing R&amp;D investment. Each firm’s R&amp;D outcome (or, its new marginal cost) is deterministically determined, and thus, when making its R&amp;D investment, each firm is certain about its R&amp;D outcome. We consider the following game. In the first stage, each firm decides and announces whether it will disclose its R&amp;D investment. Next, each firm chooses−and discloses if it announced to do so−its R&amp;D investment. Finally, the firms choose their output levels [prices] simultaneously and independently. When choosing its output level [price], each firm knows the other firm’s new marginal cost only if the other firm disclosed its R&amp;D investment. We show in both models that each firm discloses its R&amp;D investment.</p>

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Duopoly firms’ decisions on disclosing their R&D investment information

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月18日

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  • Kyung Hwan Baik,
  • Sang-Kee Kim

摘要

We study a quantity-setting duopoly and a price-setting duopoly in which each firm has the option of disclosing or not its cost-reducing R&D investment. Each firm’s R&D outcome (or, its new marginal cost) is deterministically determined, and thus, when making its R&D investment, each firm is certain about its R&D outcome. We consider the following game. In the first stage, each firm decides and announces whether it will disclose its R&D investment. Next, each firm chooses−and discloses if it announced to do so−its R&D investment. Finally, the firms choose their output levels [prices] simultaneously and independently. When choosing its output level [price], each firm knows the other firm’s new marginal cost only if the other firm disclosed its R&D investment. We show in both models that each firm discloses its R&D investment.