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<p>We introduce public-good auctions, a versatile framework addressing auction scenarios where players benefit not only from winning themselves but also when their competitors win. Distinct from private-good auctions, public-good auctions feature prizes as public goods enjoyed by all players and allow them to choose from multiple prizes. Demonstrating broad applicability, public-good auctions can be applied to various economic models, including auctions with externalities, and combinatorial auctions. The framework effectively explains unconventional situations marked by conflicting incentives between cooperation and competition and diverse behaviors, such as free-riding, cooperation, strategic voting, and multiple targeting, which are unobserved in traditional auction settings. Using a two-player model, we present four main results regarding the existence, characterization, and uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs.</p>

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Bidding for public goods

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月13日

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  • Hanjoon Michael Jung

摘要

We introduce public-good auctions, a versatile framework addressing auction scenarios where players benefit not only from winning themselves but also when their competitors win. Distinct from private-good auctions, public-good auctions feature prizes as public goods enjoyed by all players and allow them to choose from multiple prizes. Demonstrating broad applicability, public-good auctions can be applied to various economic models, including auctions with externalities, and combinatorial auctions. The framework effectively explains unconventional situations marked by conflicting incentives between cooperation and competition and diverse behaviors, such as free-riding, cooperation, strategic voting, and multiple targeting, which are unobserved in traditional auction settings. Using a two-player model, we present four main results regarding the existence, characterization, and uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs.