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<p>We discuss the problem of choosing between two public alternatives under the assumption that preferences are quasi-linear and that one of the two alternatives represents the status quo. We characterize the class of strategy-proof and feasible mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, that are not dominated by another strategy-proof and feasible mechanism. These mechanisms form an <i>n</i>-parameter infinite family. Within this class only the Unanimity mechanism is anonymous.</p>

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Binary public decisions with a status quo: Undominated mechanisms without harm

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月27日

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  • Efthymios Athanasiou,
  • Giacomo Valletta

摘要

We discuss the problem of choosing between two public alternatives under the assumption that preferences are quasi-linear and that one of the two alternatives represents the status quo. We characterize the class of strategy-proof and feasible mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, that are not dominated by another strategy-proof and feasible mechanism. These mechanisms form an n-parameter infinite family. Within this class only the Unanimity mechanism is anonymous.