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<p>We introduce the Chair Allocation problem, a three-sided matching market where researchers apply for a chair in a university, and universities request chairs (composed of a university and a research topic) to a central authority. We propose a new algorithm, the Chair Nested Deferred Acceptance algorithm, and show that it is fair, undominated by other fair assignments, and strategy-proof for researchers.</p>

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The Chair Allocation problem

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月16日

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  • Francis Bloch,
  • David Cantala,
  • Damián Gibaja

摘要

We introduce the Chair Allocation problem, a three-sided matching market where researchers apply for a chair in a university, and universities request chairs (composed of a university and a research topic) to a central authority. We propose a new algorithm, the Chair Nested Deferred Acceptance algorithm, and show that it is fair, undominated by other fair assignments, and strategy-proof for researchers.